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The World Health Organization defines a zoonosis as any infection naturally transmissible
from vertebrate animals to humans. The pandemic of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been classified as a zoonotic disease, however, no animal
reservoir has yet been found, so this classification is premature. We propose that
COVID-19 should instead be classified an “emerging infectious disease (EID) of probable
animal origin.” To explore if COVID-19 infection fits our proposed re-categorization vs.
the contemporary definitions of zoonoses, we reviewed current evidence of infection
origin and transmission routes of SARS-CoV-2 virus and described this in the context
of known zoonoses, EIDs and “spill-over” events. Although the initial one hundred
COVID-19 patients were presumably exposed to the virus at a seafood Market in
China, and despite the fact that 33 of 585 swab samples collected from surfaces and
cages in the market tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, no virus was isolated directly
from animals and no animal reservoir was detected. Elsewhere, SARS-CoV-2 has
been detected in animals including domesticated cats, dogs, and ferrets, as well as
captive-managed mink, lions, tigers, deer, and mice confirming zooanthroponosis. Other
than circumstantial evidence of zoonotic cases inmink farms in the Netherlands, no cases
of natural transmission from wild or domesticated animals have been confirmed. More
than 40 million human COVID-19 infections reported appear to be exclusively through
human-human transmission. SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 do not meet the WHO
definition of zoonoses. We suggest SARS-CoV-2 should be re-classified as an EID of
probable animal origin.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of “spill-over” or “evolutionary jump” refers
to the transmission of a pathogen from a natural animal host
to a novel host leading to infection in the new host. This may
transpire by chance, novel exposure, repeated exposure, or key
genomic change enabling the pathogen to infect the new host
(1). Infection in the new host can result in a dead-end or can
lead to spread through secondary epidemiological cycling to
conspecifics, or even zooanthroponotic transmission as is the
case with COVID-19. Spill-over is a chance event rather than a
normal part of organism infection cycles. In popular terminology
cross-species spill-over, where it becomes established, is defined
as a pathogen jump from animals to humans (1). Spill-over is
illustrated by human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and Ebola in
recent decades, and yellow fever, dengue, measles, and smallpox
in the past centuries (2).
The term zoonosis is very plainly defined by the World
Health Organization (WHO) as “any infection that is naturally
transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans” (3). This is
qualified by stating that the infection is maintained in an animal
population (a reservoir) and therefore a continuous source
of human infection (3). This encompasses infections that are
acquired by humans through direct contact with animals, as well
as infections transmitted through indirect exposure routes such
as vector-borne or environmental and food system pathogens.
An example of a zoonosis is rabies, which is almost entirely
transmitted by the bite of an infected dog with exceptionally
rare spill-over from wild animals (4). Wildlife are defined by
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) as any of
the followings: (a) wild animals (phylogenetically distinct wild
animal species, free-ranging), (b) feral [domesticated] animals,
free-ranging, and (c) non-domestic animals in captivity or
farming. However, although the WHO definition does delineate
between diseases that originate in animals but independently
persist in human populations, vs. diseases that require a non-
human animal host for pathogen survival and persistence, there
is no term to describe the former and contemporary literature
often incorrectly terms the former as well as the latter diseases
as zoonoses.
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are currently defined
as “Diseases that have newly appeared in a population or have
existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic
range” (5) with the period of emergence appearing somewhat
open for interpretation. This definition does not distinguish
between different categories of emergence or re-emergence and
thus does not reflect the very different drivers and significance
between diseases and pathogens in terms of global burden,
threat and origin. Further, it does not necessarily differentiate
the relatively uncommon but concerning new diseases with
pandemic impact or potential such as SARS, COVID-19 or
MERS-CoV from those which are simply variants of old
pathogens, new detections of old pathogens with new tools, or re-
emergence of old pathogens in new geographies, acknowledging
that these may be locally important. Thus, the term EID as it
stands is unhelpful at best, and at worst easily misinterpreted.
Although the ambiguity undoubtedly needs to be addressed at
greater scale, we suggest an interim solution for the classification
of COVID-19 is to designate it an “EID of probable animal
origin.” This acknowledges its status as an emerging human
pathogen while allowing for the possibility that it spilled-over
from an animal reservoir but stops short of misrepresenting it
as a zoonotic disease. EIDs are not necessarily of animal origin,
however categorizing them correctly allows it for distinction
and ultimate focus and allocation of resource attention. Most
diseases classified as EIDs over the last few decades [e.g., (6)]
are variants of known pathogens, new detections of pathogens
with new technologies, or known pathogens which have
emerged or re-emerged in new geographies. Examples include:
Enterococcus faecalis var-Gentamycin resistant, Escherichia coli
O157:H7 (novel variants), West Nile virus, and Zika virus
(changing geographies).
Differentiating between diseases that may originate in
animals but independently persist in human populations, vs.
diseases that require a non-human animal host for pathogen
survival and persistence will enable more targeted and strategic
initiatives in infectious disease research, policy, prevention,
and control. Additionally, greater specificity and distinction
between these types of pathogens will avoid the confusion and
misrepresentation that arises from classifying the majority of
relatively low-impact, rare zoonotic infections that spill-over
from wild animals under the same zoonotic designation as the
more common [ongoing] zoonotic transmissions from domestic
animals and captive wildlife species. This will clarify the common
narrative that ∼60% of emerging infectious diseases are of
zoonotic origin and ∼70% of these originate from wildlife
(which includes all wild animals, feral animals and captive
or farmed wildlife—as defined earlier) (6), when in fact only
very few diseases of wild animal origin persist with ongoing
zoonotic transmission. The World Health Organization (2020)
currently list the EIDs of epidemic concern in their research
and development blueprint as COVID-19, Crimean Congo
haemorrhagic fever (CCHF), Ebola and Marburg viruses, Lassa
Fever, MERS, and SARS coronaviruses, Nipah and henipaviral
diseases, Rift Valley fever (RVF), Zika and “Disease X” (“a
serious international epidemic could be caused by a pathogen
currently unknown to cause human disease”) (7). Of these, the
only ongoing zoonoses are extremely rare sylvatic spill-over cases
of Marburg, CCHF and henipaviruses from wild animals, and
RVF andMERS cases from livestock. Lassa Fever is acquired from
a peri-domestic rodent, while the source of Ebola virus, SARS,
and SARS-CoV-2 remain enigmatic with the vast majority of
human infections from these diseases acquired through human-
human transmission.
The pandemic of Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been designated a zoonotic disease
(8, 9). The SARS-CoV-1 emergence in 2002 was similarly defined
as a zoonotic disease, however, despite identification of over 500
beta (β) coronaviruses from bats in the region of emergence and
surrounding area, no reservoir has been definitively confirmed
(6). This paper argues for a correction of the current biased
narrative around zoonoses through an examination of the
COVID-19 pandemic and further demonstrates that, unlike
conventional zoonoses which can be relatively intractable (e.g.,
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2020 | Volume 8 | Article 596944
Haider et al. COVID-19—Zoonosis or Emerging Infectious Disease
rabies), EID emergence has been consistently linked to human
pressures on ecosystems largely through our food systems
(especially livestock), suggesting that EIDs may be preventable
(6, 10). This article further explores SARS-CoV-2 transmission
evidence across species and suggests that COVID-19 should
instead be classified as an “emerging infectious disease of probable
animal origin.”
METHODS
To explore if the COVID-19 infection fits our proposed
categorization as an EID of probable animal origin, we reviewed
current evidence and the designation of different diseases as
zoonoses and EIDs as well as the classification of simple spill-
over events. We also sought to assign origin percentages to
pathogen emergence in consideration of domesticated animals
vs. wildlife with the latter separated into peri-domestic, captive-
managed/farmed, and free-ranging groupings (see earlier OIE
definition of wildlife) (Figure 1). Domesticated animals are
defined as those used for food production, draft power, sport, or
companion animals. Peri-domestic wildlife are defined as animals
adapting to human landscapes and living in close proximity
to people including animals brought into human habitation as
food. Captive-managed/farmed non-domestic and peri-domestic
wildlife species are mostly from the rodent, primate, carnivore,
herbivore, bird and bat taxa and are the most important from the
perspective of zoonoses and EIDs.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The COVID-19 pandemic is an infection caused by SARS-
CoV-2, a novel coronavirus first detected in Wuhan city,
Hubei province, China at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale
[Wet] Market where epidemiological investigation found that
approximately one hundred of the initial patients were
exposed (11–14). Animal food commodities from over one
hundred domestic and wild species such as bats, mink, fox,
wolves, snakes, Chinese bamboo rats, civet cats, raccoon
dogs, cats, porcupines, dogs, poultry, camels, and other
farm animals as well as fish were reportedly sold at this
location and at hundreds of similar markets across the
region. Live purchase and slaughter also occurred on all
premises (11).
Evidence for the market being a point source outbreak of
SARS-CoV-2 is based on the tracing of patients’ movements and
reports that 33 of 585 swab samples collected from surfaces and
cages in the market tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (15). The
majority of positive samples (n = 31) were taken from stalls
that traded animals designated as “wildlife,” although most of
the animals may have been reared in captivity (15). Regrettably,
no live animal or animal product sampling for SARS-CoV-2 at
the market has been reported. Chinese authorities subsequently
implemented a national ban on wildlife trade with exceptions
for fur, medicine, and research (16). This was done before
forensic examination of the wildlife industry for SARS-CoV-2
was possible. As of mid-October 2020, it is likely that SARS-
CoV-2 initially spilled-over directly or indirectly from animals or
animal-based food products to humans in China via the Wuhan
market or potentially a similar source such as restaurants or
home deliveries (17), farms, and/or other wildlife product supply
chains. However, the initial spill-over event cannot now be easily
proven and human origin virus brought into the market may
also be a source of point epidemics as is believed to be the
case in later resurgences such as at a market in Beijing (18),
meat factories and similar industries. Serological surveillance
of bat workers and guano farmers in southern China showed
a low-level of seroconversion to SARS-like coronavirus-specific
antibodies (19), suggesting that direct transmission from bats is
also possible, though no ill health was associated with patient
exposure. In contrast, SARS research in 2003–2004 showed
animal food trade workers to be infected or possess anti-SARS
antibodies, suggesting SARS virus spill-over to workers from
confirmed-infected animal species and or zooanthroponosis
(reverse zoonosis) (20). In South East Asia, wildlife supply
chains for human consumption and other products have been
associated with increased disease transmission risk but without
proven zoonosis cases (21). Some 14 million Chinese work in
the wildlife farming industry which encompasses the fur trade
and was valued at approximately $73 billion USD by a Chinese
Academy of Engineering report in 2017. This collective industry
may constitute by far the greatest infection risk from all wildlife
in the region (22).
Phylogenetic analysis of the β-coronavirus genera indicated
that SARS-CoV-2 is similar to some viruses identified in bats in a
group described as SARS/SARS-like CoV (23). The SARS-CoV-2
virus is 96% identical at the whole-genome level to a coronavirus
isolated from horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus affinis) in Yunnan
province, China (23) and its evolution suggests common ancestry
approximately 50 years ago (24). A coronavirus identified in
a Malayan pangolin (Manis javanica) was also found to share
a 91% identical sequence at full genome level to SARS-CoV-2
(25). Further bioinformatic analysis allowes the identification of
a unique peptide insertion (PRRA) in the spike protein of SARS-
CoV-2, however this insertion is absent in the spike protein of
the coronavirus identified in pangolins (termed Pangolin CoV)
(26). Throat and rectal swabs collected from 334 Sunda pangolins
(Manis javanica) in Malaysia between 2009 and 2019 were all
negative for Coronaviridae (27), suggesting that pangolins might
have been contaminated with coronavirus in the wildlife trade
network (27). Thus, although they are widely traded throughout
South and South East Asia, scientists concluded that SARS-CoV-
2 was unlikely to have spilled-over directly from pangolins (28).
At present, the possible animal source of SARS CoV-2, or the
transitional virus it may have evolved from, remains unknown.
Genetic features indicate that SARS-CoV-2 could have resulted
from natural selection in animal species before its evolutionary
jump into humans, or that after a zoonotic transfer the virus
was naturally selected within the human population. However,
there is a dearth of information to indicate which hypothesis
reflects the eventual outcome (26) and no conclusive evidence
for any of these routes has so far been found. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that SARS-CoV-2 has an animal origin in
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FIGURE 1 | Pathway diagram for pathogen spill-over to humans from animals describes three distinct processes. (1) Zoonoses: Pathogens that are transmitted from
an animal reservoir directly or indirectly (e.g., foodborne, vector-borne, etc.) to humans causing disease; (2) Emerging Infectious Diseases: Pathogens that cause an
emergent infectious disease in humans and persist in human populations irrespective of an animal reservoir. Genetic origins may show links to non-human animals,
but these diseases undergo a more complex process of evolution not necessarily dependent on a specific animal reservoir, and usually evolve to be independent of
animals, (3) Zooanthroponosis: “Reverse zoonosis” whereby humans transmit infection to animals. Infected animals, may or may not then go on to circulate the
pathogen or establish a disease within conspecific population. A disease can fall into more than one category as exemplified in the figure by Nipah, MERS, and
SARS-CoV-2. Spill-over origin for zoonoses and emerging pathogens (i.e., animals) is given proportion by the size of the circles. The relative infection frequency of
spill-over from domestic animals and wildlife is quantified in the percentages shown. Proportion of animals was determined from a review of the literature which found
that only 4% of global mammalian biomass is wild, of which >50% is estimated to be marine mammals, with livestock making up ∼60% of the remainder (39).
Percent of emerging pathogens coming from wildlife was derived from the assessment that ∼60% of EIDs are zoonotic, with 71.8% of those found to have wildlife
genetic origins (6). Percent zoonoses derived from domestic vs. wild species is a rough estimate based on available data from a variety of publications and considers
the following: zoonoses have been estimated to cause 2.5 billion cases of human illness, 2.4 billion of which are caused by thirteen diseases, all of which bear
relevance to agriculture (40); zoonotic viral richness is strongly correlated with mammalian species diversity and abundance with domestic species found to harbor, on
average, 19.3 zoonotic viruses compared to an average of 0.23 harbored by wildlife, suggesting wildlife harbor >0.5% of viral diversity (43). In addition, an analysis of
mammalian species with the greatest number of viruses shared with humans found the top eight species to be domestic (43). Our estimate that 99% of zoonotic
diseases spill over from domestic animals is considered reliable for direct zoonotic transmission and indirect foodborne infection, though less reliable for vector borne
diseases.
an evolutionary sense (26), but there is no categorical proof to
suggest it should be characterized as a directly- or indirectly-
transmitted zoonotic disease.
In the months after COVID-19 was reported on all continents
(except Antarctica) and designated a human pandemic by the
WHO, SARS-CoV-2 has been detected in a small number of
animals who had been exposed to infected humans or challenged
experimentally. These include domesticated cats, dogs, and
ferrets, and captive-managed mink, lions, and tigers, suggesting
zooanthroponosis (8, 29–32). Four domesticated cats (one each
in Hong Kong, Belgian, French and American cities) and three
dogs (two in Hong Kong, and one in the USA) all belonging
to COVID-19-positive owners tested positive (29). Experimental
studies have shown that cats, ferrets, and primates are susceptible
to infection with SARS-CoV-2 and can transmit the virus. Zoo
animals including a tiger and a lion were reported to have
been infected by their zoo career (8, 33, 34). Zooanthroponotic
infections (human to mink) occurred in the Netherlands,
Denmark and Spain, and mink-to-human transmission has been
suggested (29, 35) leading to the slaughter of all mink on
infected farms. This raises the possibility of wider dissemination
and future involvement of multiple species in SARS-CoV-2
circulation and persistence, but few studies have been completed
thus far (36–38). Thus, evidence to date indicates that SARS-
CoV-2 should not be considered a zoonosis and wildlife should
not be the default culprit not only for COVID-19 but for other
inappropriately labeled zoonoses.
The definition of zoonoses is important in the story of SARS-
CoV-2, as a precise understanding of its origins and epidemiology
is vital to determining the risk of spill-over recurring and the
drivers of such an event. Furthermore, this precise understanding
is also important for determining the risk of spill-over and
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drivers for other pathogens of pandemic potential. In order to
inform policy and target research it is important to differentiate
spill-over from domesticated animals vs. from wildlife and in
turn differentiate free-roaming wildlife from captive-managed
animals that may have wild origins but have either been caught
and maintained or bred in captivity.
A distinction between EIDs and zoonotic diseases in terms
of spill-over origin from domesticated vs. wildlife biomass is
represented in Figure 1. The proportion of domestic to wild
animals was determined from a review of the literature which
suggests that only 4% of global mammalian biomass is wild,
of which >50% were estimated to be marine mammals (39)
with livestock making up ∼60% of the remainder (39). Humans
comprise the remaining 36% of mammalian biomass, but in
considering non-human mammals alone, these estimates suggest
that wildlife make up <1% of the world’s non-human mammal
biomass. It is also worth considering that these ratios may differ
greatly between different geographies and also temporally as
populations fluctuate with breeding seasons. Nonetheless, these
figures augmented the estimates for percent zoonoses derived
from domestic vs. wild species, which is a rough estimate that
considers the following additional points: zoonoses have been
estimated to cause 2.5 billion cases of human illness, 2.4 billion
of which are caused by thirteen diseases of which nine have high
impact on livestock (40). Zoonotic diseases most frequently cited
as “high impact” are endemic zoonoses such as rabies, brucellosis
and cysticercosis which have clear proven transmission links with
domestic animals (40). For instance, of the estimated 59,000
annually-reported human rabies cases, 99% are transmitted
through the bite of an infected dog (41). While it’s been estimated
that 88.6% of terrestrial mammals have yet to be diagnosed with
a zoonotic virus, zoonotic viral richness is strongly correlated
with mammalian species diversity and abundance (42). For
instance, 50% of zoonotic virus richness detected thus far has
been found in domesticated species with these animals hosting
an average of 19.3 viral species each, compared to wild species
surveyed harboring an average of 0.23 (42). This suggests that
wildlife harbor >0.5% of viral diversity (42). The study by
Johnson et al. (43) also associated increased viral abundance
with growing domesticated species population in proximity to
humans, namely changes in livestock food systems in response to
increased urban-based demand for animal products (43). While
it is acknowledged that this is an educated assumption, we argue
that our estimate that 99% of zoonotic diseases spill-over from
domesticated animals, is reliable for direct zoonotic transmission
and indirect foodborne infection, though less reliable for vector
borne diseases.
In considering EIDs, a 2008 study by Jones et al., reviewed
EID origin from 1940 to 2004 and found that 60% of EIDs
originate in animals (6). Of the animal-origin EIDs, 71.8% were
found to have wild animal genetic origins, suggesting that 28.2%
to jump to humans from domesticated species [(6); Figure 1].
As illustrated in Figure 1, we also explored the term wildlife in
the context of peri-domestic, captive/managed farmed animals
and free-roaming.
In considering the proposition that bush meat poses zoonotic
transmission risk (42), much of the wildlife [game] industry
in the southern Africa should not be considered free-ranging
wildlife, nor bush meat by definition, but rather wild animal
farming. It is likely this industry is a source of general zoonotic
pathogens that are seen in conventional livestock food systems
given that they often live side by side and share similar
husbandry andmanagement risks in terms of intensification (44).
Similarly, in the case of most “wild” animals traded in markets,
it is important to distinguish that they were not from wild-
living populations, but from farmed or captive populations of
species that are not fully domesticated but are kept in domestic
conditions (11). The pathogenesis of infections in these densely
populated farms and live markets such as those harboring civet
cats and raccoon dogs or mink in the meat and fur trade, will be
very different to infection cycles in natural [wild] populations.
These crowded environments, similar to intensive [livestock]
farming, are likely incubators of spill-over-disposed pathogens
such as SARS-like viruses (45). Bats most likely have a role in this
story as originators of progenitor viruses, but it is likely a result
of their close contact with other species through wildlife trade or
directly with humans that facilitated dissemination.
The SARS-CoV-1 event of 2002–2004 and the sudden
emergence of SARS-CoV-2 from a similar virus leading to its
subsequent pandemic spread in humans suggests these events
are likely end points in an ongoing development process
(46). Therefore, it can be expected that without changes to
the pathogen evolutionary landscape, similar future events are
inevitable. In the quest to prevent this occurrence, research
should focus on understanding the wider environmental and
societal structures that foster emergence of novel diseases. In
prioritizing areas for immediate attention, we propose launching
an ongoing investigation into the animal-based food systems
(including wildlife) in an effort to identify: (1) Zoonotic
disease (as defined by the WHO) risks; (2) Investigate potential
intermediate amplifying hosts from known viral reservoirs;
(3) Implement the International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) and OIE (47) risk analysis methodologies for
pathogen emergence and zoonosis from the wildlife trade
industry, including wider analysis of anthropogenic drivers
to identify vital factors which can be addressed expediently;
(4) Encourage social distancing between wildlife and humans
(mutually beneficial); and (5) Apply international domesticated
animal food zoosanitary standards on all species used for food,
globally. As an early attempt on how this can be achieved there is
a need to combine risk analysis with value chain analysis (48).
A key thread linking these prioritizes, is the direct relationship
between the economy, disease and how we react to the presence
or risk of a disease, a fact that has been underscored by the
COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding this relationship in the
context of zoonotic diseases is challenging and requires the
evaluation of the economic impacts of disease on domesticated
species such as livestock, alongside the human health impacts
(49). Livestock production is an economic activity with positive
and negative public health implications where disease impacts
can be monetarised, whereas human health loss has challenges
with a reluctance to place a monetary value on ill health
particularly given that cost of treatment and loss of wages can
vary depending on geographic and demographic indicators (49).
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Human health has adopted the Disability Adjusted Life
Year (DALY) as a non-monetary measure of illness burden.
DALYs are the metric that have been accepted by the WHO
as a means of assessing the global burden of human disease,
and there is an emerging system for assessing the burden of
animal diseases (50). Bringing these approaches together will
enhance our capacity for assessing zoonotic disease burden
in its human-centric approach, but reduces efficacy of disease
burden estimations and health costs in the animal sector (51,
52).
Irrespective of the lack of synergy in economic impact
tools across species, it is undisputed that economics directly
influence pathogen emergence and spread through trade,
tourism, urbanization and globalization (53, 54). In turn,
epidemics and pandemics influence local, national and
global economies (55). Once a pathogen has emerged as an
epidemic or pandemic threat, a clear understanding of the
events that spawned outbreak and persistence in terms of
pathogen evolution, transmission routes and epidemiology
is vital for evaluation of economic impact and related
policy development.
The classification of COVID-19 as a zoonotic disease, and the
fact that its emergence was linked to the Huanan [wet] Seafood
Market, led China to shut down and ban the farming and sale of
wildlife for human consumption. This has been lauded by many
and may well have been the correct tactic as a precautionary
measure, but the impacts on economy and livelihoods may be
unjustified until the risk is more comprehensively understood.
Indeed, coupled with erasing forensic evidence for evaluation
of SARS-CoV-2 emergence, severe economic implications may
follow, particularly for lower income communities who have
been encouraged in recent years by government agencies
to invest family savings into initiating wildlife farming (56,
57). It is also likely that a ban on wildlife food trade will
strengthen that black market industry (56, 57). These probable
consequences will come with their own set of ramifications
and may not address the underlying problems of disease
emergence when we explore SARS-CoV-2 as an “EID of probable
animal origin”.
The terms zoonosis and EID are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. For example, MERS virus meets the criteria for a
zoonosis with the Dromedary camel serving as the known animal
reservoir and natural animal-human transmission recorded
consistently in Middle Eastern countries since 2012. MERS also
fits the definition of EID as it can be transmitted between
humans and emerged as an infectious disease with no evidence of
historical infections. Similarly, EIDsmay be of human not animal
origin [e.g., Hepatitis B virus (2)].
CONCLUSION
Current narratives around wildlife and zoonoses are biased
and disproportionate. However, increasing evidence for novel
emerging pathogens of humans beyond an historic norm
requires forensic examination of their origin and epidemiology.
At the time of writing (mid-October, 2020), more than 40
million confirmed human cases of COVID-19 have been
reported to the WHO (58). It is likely that only a few
direct or indirect zoonotic transmissions of SARS-CoV-2 virus
occurred from unknown animals or their products. It is
hypothesized that such transmission led to a point source
outbreak at the Huanan Seafood Market in China resulting in
wider human-human transmission, which caused the pandemic.
Since the transmission—directly or indirectly—of the virus
between animals and humans, and a reservoir—if one exists—
is unknown, we argue that strictly speaking, it should not be
termed a zoonosis, but rather COVID-19 should be classified
an “EID of probable animal origin.” It is evident the virus
possesses the ability to transmit between humans without
requiring maintenance in a separate reservoir species and
can transmit zooanthroponotically. Re-classification of COVID-
19 as an EID makes it no less valuable or imperative that
research confirm whether an animal reservoir actually exists
especially considering that if one does, it could become
a potential source of future human infection. Moreover, it
will influence not only the ongoing research and response
to COVID-19 specifically, but will reshape and revamp the
way the international community addresses future pandemic
preparedness and threats. Additionally, withdrawing the ill-
suited designation of SARS-CoV-2 as a zoonosis will reduce
the risk of inappropriate animal persecution or other unsuitable
interventions whilst the source of the problem or animal
associated risk is unknown. In their emergence, EIDs have
historically been known to share several key characteristics
regardless of pathogen type: high morbidity, explosive growth
and spread, and grave social impacts (53). We therefore argue
that it is imperative to review COVID-19 predominantly as an
EID in order to address the underlying drivers of the emergence
of such pathogens which can be so readily driven, yet so easily
adjusted by human activities. In closing, we propose that a
whole of society debate around the designation of a disease as
a zoonosis vs. an EID as well as the nuances within each term
is needed to reduce the risks of disease events such as COVID-
19 in the future through appropriate actions in the human
political landscape.
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